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Abstract-A log management system (LMS) is a system for 
creating, receiving, processing, releasing, and transferring of 
security log data. Its main objectives include detecting and 
preventing unauthorised access and abuse, and meeting 
regulatory requirements. One of its main components is the 
classification of events to make decisions related to archiving 
and to invoking responses to certain events.  Most current 
approaches to LMS design are system dependent and involve 
specific hardware (e.g., firewalls, servers) and commercial 
software systems. This paper presents a theoretical framework 
for LMS in terms of a flow-based conceptual model with 
emphasis on security-related events. The framework includes 
four separate flow systems: active system, log system, alarm 
system, and response system. All systems are composed of five 
inclusive stages: receiving, processing, creating, releasing, and 
transferring. The experimental part of the paper concentrates 
on log analysis in the processing stage in the log system. We 
select actual log entries and classify them according to these 
five stages. 
Keyword-log management system, security-related events, 
conceptual model, logs classification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
log is a record of a computer event arising during 
processing in systems and networks. It is ―append-only, 
time stamped records representing some event that has 
occurred in some computer or network device‖ [23]. 
Logging refers to the action of recording events in a log 
database. Event logging is a major component in most 
critical systems. Applications, security systems, and 
operating system components can make use of a centralised 
log service to report events that have taken place, such as a 
failure to start a module, complete an action, or block or 
deny some connections. 
A centralised log service provides valuable security-related 
functions such as troubleshooting and monitoring. Logging 
tools can improve security for systems, applications, and 
storage with benefits that include the following [19] [13] 
- Detect/prevent unauthorised access and insider abuse  
- Meet regulatory requirements  
- Analyse and correlate forensic data  
- Track suspicious behaviour 
- IT troubleshooting and network operations 
The use of computer security logs from servers, network 
devices, diagnostic tools, and security-specific devices has 
increased tremendously (89 percent of organisations in 
2010, compared with 43 percent in 2005 [19]). This has 
created the need for log management. (Security) log 
management is the process ―for generating, transmitting,  
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storing, analyzing, and disposing of computer security log 
data‖ [18]. According to [18], a fundamental problem with 
log management is balancing log management resources 
with the quantity of log data. ―Log generation and storage 
can be complicated by several factors, including a high 
number of log sources; inconsistent log content, formats, 
and timestamps among sources; and increasingly large 
volumes of log data‖ [18]. There are several widely used 
formats of log messages, e.g., Apache Common Log Format 
[14] for Web servers, and Unix Syslog format [10]; 
however, there are no common standards for log message 
encoding. 
To assist in facilitating more efficient and effective log 
management, Kent [18] recommends the establishment of a 
log management infrastructure that is used to generate, 
transmit, store, analyze, and dispose of log data, and support 
the policy and roles. When designing infrastructures, major 
factors to be considered include the volume to be processed, 
network bandwidth, storage, the security requirements, and 
resources needed for staff to analyze the logs. [18]  
There are many log management systems on the market, and 
also many internally managed log management systems.  It 
is reported that ―because of difficulties in setup and 
integration, most organizations have only achieved partial 
automation of their log management and reporting 
processes‖ [19]. According to Patrick Mueller [21],  
The legal requirements around log management may make 
you feel like you're battling the Hydra—solve one problem, 
two more pop up in its place. Analyzing and aggregating the 
incessant streams of information created by computer and 
network logs has always been a difficult, thankless task, but 
now it's taking on epic proportions because of regulatory 
compliance. 
For example, the 2006 PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) 
requires that certain events be logged with specific details of 
each audit entry and with network time synchronisation 
among logging components. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandates 
―hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that 
record and examine activity in information systems that 
contain or use electronic protected health information." 
Modern log management systems are typically complex 
systems. Although LMS is dependent on actual 
requirements and needs, theoretical study of these systems 
provides a foundation for requirement analysis, design, and 
implementation. Design of such a system needs all system 
development methodologies that have been used in other 
computer systems. Insufficient efforts have been invested in 
studying LMS in the abstract. 
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This paper is concerned with developing high-level 
architectural issues for these systems. After reviewing 
current abstract architectures, we propose a conceptual 
model that depicts various functionalities involved in 
logging procedure. The paper also concentrates on computer 
security related logs that can be generated by many sources, 
including security software, intrusion detection systems, 
operating systems, and applications. An implementation-
independent scheme of classification of log entries is also 
proposed. The classification method is applied to actual 
entries of events. Our approach is based on a flow model, as 
reviewed in the next section. 
II. FLOW MODEL 
Recently, a flow model (FM) has been proposed and used in 
several applications, including communication and 
engineering requirement analysis. For the sake of making 
this paper self-contained, we review such a model 
introduced in several works [4], with additional materials 
related to event classification. 
In FM, the flow of ―things‖ indicates movement inside and 
between spheres. The sphere is the environment of the flow 
and includes five stages that may be subspheres with their 
own five-stage schema. The stages may be named 
differently; for example, in an information sphere, a stage 
may be called ―communication,‖ while in raw material flow 
the same stage is called ―transportation‖. The information 
creation stage may be called ―manufacturing‖ in materials 
flow. 
A. General view 
A flow model is a uniform method for representing things 
that ―flow‖, i.e., things that are exchanged, processed, 
created, transferred, and communicated. ―Things that flow‖, 
called flowthings, include information, materials (e.g., in 
manufacturing), and money. To simplify this review of FM, 
we introduce the model in terms of information flow. 
Information occurs in five states: transferred, received, 
processed, created, and released, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Here, we view "state of information" in the sense of 
properties; for example, water occurs in nature in the states 
of liquid, solid, and gas. 
 
Fig. 1 also represents a transition graph, called flowsystem, 
with five states and arrows representing flows among these 
states. Information can also be stored, copied, destroyed, 
used, etc., but these are secondary states of information in 
any of the five generic states. In Fig. 1, flows are denoted by 
solid arrows that may trigger other types of flow, denoted 
by dashed arrows, as will be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The environment in which information exists is called its 
sphere (e.g., computer, human mind, organisation 
information system, department information system). The 
flowsystem is reusable because a copy of it is assigned to 
each entity (e.g., software system, vendor, and user). An 
entity may have multiple flowsystems, each with its own 
flowsystem. As will be developed later, an improvement 
cycle can be described in terms of flowsystems of different 
flowthings: information, plans, actions, and systems. As 
forms of information, plans, actions, and systems are 
flowthings that can be received, processed, created, released, 
and transferred. 
A flowsystem may not necessarily include all states; for 
example, conceptualisation of a physical airport can model 
the flow of passengers: received (arriving), processed (e.g., 
passports examined), released (waiting to board), and 
transferred (to planes); however, airports do not create 
passengers (ignoring the possibility of an emergency where 
a baby is born in the airport). In this case, the flowsystem of 
the airport includes only passenger states of received, 
processed, released, and transferred. 
As mentioned, we view a system as the environment in 
which information exists, called its sphere (e.g., computer, 
human mind, organisation information system, department 
information system). A system is also viewed as a complex 
of flowsystems. From this perspective, many notions 
discussed in this paper take different spots. For example, 
―Where events happen‖ is understood as the position of 
events in flowsystems and in stages of flowsystems. ―Who 
is affected‖ is translated as what flowsystem is affected. 
―What subsystems are involved‖ asks what subflowsystems 
are involved. This also applies to flows, substages, and so 
forth related to events. 
Processed 
flowthing, e.g., 
transformed, 
reshaped. 
 
Created 
flowthing, e.g., 
new, constructed, 
manufactured. 
 
Released 
flowthing, 
e.g., to be 
shipped out, 
for departure, 
to be 
disclosed. 
 
Received 
flowthing, e.g., 
arrived or 
collected. 
 Fig. 1. State transition diagram for the flow model 
with possible triggering mechanism. 
Triggering another type of flow 
 
Transferred 
flowthing, e.g., 
being transmitted, 
communicated, or 
transported. 
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B. Exclusiveness of information states 
The states shown in Fig. 1 are exclusive in the sense that if 
information is in one state, it is not in any of the other four 
states. Consider a piece of information  in the possession 
of a hospital. Then,  is in the possession of the hospital and 
can be in only one of the following states: 
1.  has just been collected (received) from some source, 
e.g., patient, friend, or agency, and stored in the hospital 
record waiting to be used. It is received (row) information 
that has not been processed by the hospital. 
2.  has been processed in some way, converted to another 
form (e.g., digital), translated, compressed, etc. In addition, 
it may be stored in the hospital information system as 
processed data waiting for some use. 
3.  has actually been created in the hospital as the result of 
doctors‘ diagnoses, lab tests, processing of current 
information (e.g., data mining), and so forth. Thus,  is in 
the possession of the hospital as created data to be used. 
4.  is being released from the hospital information sphere. 
It is designated as released information ready for transfer 
(e.g., sent via DHL). In an analogy of a factory environment, 
 would represent materials designated as ready to ship 
outside the factory. They may actually be stored for some 
period waiting to be transported; nevertheless, their 
designation as ―for export‖ keeps them in such a state. 
5.  is in a transferred state, i.e., it is being transferred 
between two information spheres. It has left the released 
state and will enter the received state, where it will become 
received information in the new information sphere. 
It is not possible for processed information to directly 
become received information in the same flowsystem.  
Processed information can become received information in 
another flowsystem by first becoming released information, 
then transferred information, then arriving at (being received 
by) another flowsystem. 
Consider the seller and buyer information spheres shown in 
Fig. 2. Each contains two flowsystems: one for the flow of 
orders, and the other for the flow of invoices. In the seller‘s 
infosphere, processing of an order triggers (circle 3) the 
creation of an invoice in the seller‘s information sphere, thus 
initiating the flow of invoices. 
The reflexive arrow of the transfer state shown in Fig. 1 
(above) denotes flow from the transfer state of one 
flowsystem to the transfer state of another. 
 
In Fig. 2, the Buyer creates an Order that flows by being 
released and is then transferred to the Seller. The ―transfer 
components‖ of the Buyer and the Seller can be viewed as 
their transmission subsystems, while the arrow between 
them represents the actual transmission channel. 
The notion of triggering will be used in our cycle of 
improvement, where information flow (e.g., data about a 
current system) triggers plan flow, which in turn triggers 
action flow that creates a new system (system flow) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Formal View 
Fig. 2 illustrates the triggering mechanism of flows of 
orders and invoices. An important principle of FM is the 
separation of flows. An order triggers an invoice, and each 
has its flowsystem in its own information sphere. Triggering 
in the context of FM means activation of a state or substate, 
which may generate a flow. Suppose the receive state is 
activated by triggering; when flow is received, triggering 
may then result in: 
(1) Activating the flow to release 
(2) Activating the flow to process 
(3) Mistriggering 
Mistriggering indicates that the triggering has not 
succeeded. Triggering may specify a chain of flow. For 
example, a triggering in receive may specify flow to release 
or flow to release and transfer. In the last case the triggering 
is a chain of triggering. 
FM reflects a map of possible flows, just as a city map 
represents possible routes. Traffic lights internally trigger 
flows.  
Secondary stages include Copy, Store, Delete, and Destroy 
that can be in any of the five FM stages.  For example, there 
is stored received information, stored created information, 
stored processed information, stored released information, 
and stored transferred information.  
This FM formalisation can be supplemented with rules and 
constraints that permit flow from one state to another. 
Additional ―logic gates‖ (e.g., OR, AND) can also be 
overbuilt on the basic flowsystem. 
III. CONCEPTUALISING LOG MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The design of log management systems is a complex process 
that needs all system development methodologies that have 
been utilised in other computer systems, including 
conceptual modelling. A conceptual model is viewed as a 
high-level abstract description of concepts that correspond 
to entities, processes, and relationships in real-world 
systems. The resulting representation can be used as a first 
 
Orders 
 
 
 Created 
 
Released 
Transferred 
Transferred 
Created 
 
Received Released 
Processed 
Transferred 
Received 
Transferred Buyer 
Seller 
Invoices 
Fig. 2. Order flow triggers invoice flow. 
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step in building a less abstracted description of the 
phenomenon under study. It is also useful for identifying 
common constructs and can serve as general understanding 
in designing and communication. 
In the context of LMS, [22] presents a ―conceptual‖ model 
of a ―typical‖ log management solution utilising servers, 
firewall, and so forth. According to [22], The Syslog 
standard [is used] to aggregate logs from key systems across 
the network. A correlation engine is then used to look at 
relationships between events. This event correlation step 
allows a view into collections of events that may point to 
malicious or other unwanted network behaviour.  
Clearly, such a description is a highly specific system in 
comparison with, say, database systems that are described in 
such terms as objects, attributes, entities, and relationships.  
Fischer [9] describes transfer of a log message in a more 
abstract fashion, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
―First step to implement a logging infrastructure is listing 
critical systems ... and determining what logging is turned 
on‖ [7]. At the analysis stage, raw log data are analysed and 
interpreted to consolidate logs. Sophisticated tools are 
needed to spot security problems. A number of software 
products are available to help collect and analyse audit and 
log data. 
According to Fischer [9] 
Although the specific technical architecture of a log 
management system has to be adapted to specific 
requirements, the basic structure of a log management 
system is layered in three tiers: 
• Input layer 
• Processing layer 
• Output layer 
Fischer [9] then gives an example of a log management 
system, as shown in Fig. 4 
 
 
 
The input layer receives, formats, and sends log messages to 
the processing layer. The processing layer includes the  
processing module and the rule store (Control). Log 
messages are processed and filtered against rules to select 
different output modules. Typical processing includes 
interpretation, categorisation, normalisation, reduction, and 
execution. The rules are used to extract the needed 
information to decide which of the configured actions 
should be executed next. For example, ―the result triggers an 
action, such as displaying an alert or running an external 
program‖ [9]. The output layer uses database back-ends for 
storing and retrieving received log messages. 
An important architectural issue in OMS is the separation of 
concerns: 
Each functional subsystem or module of a system should be 
cleanly separated from other system components and 
encapsulate exclusively functionality that is absolutely 
required for the specific task…  
On a higher level of abstraction, this requirement might be 
fulfilled by structuring a log management system into the 
mentioned basic building blocks, namely input, 
processing and output layer. [9] [6] 
While this type of description is independent of a specific 
system, it falls short of drawing a complete conceptual 
picture in comparison with our FM-based model. Also, it 
does not distinguish clearly among functionalities and 
subsystems.  
IV. FM-BASED LOG SYSTEM 
We conceptualise LMS infrastructure as a system of 
flowsystems created from an active system, logging system, 
alert system, and response system, as illustrated in Fig. 5(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The notion of ―event‖ is a central concept in logging. 
Logged events are selected to cover different types of events 
at different security-relevant points in the system. In FM, 
events are flowthings that can be received (e.g., the event of 
log-in), processed (e.g., request to retrieve data), created 
(e.g., activating a program), released (e.g., the action of 
buffering out bound file), and transferred (e.g., 
Source Log system 
Operating system 
File Network 
Fig. 3. Example transfer of a log message 
(Modified from [9]). 
Processing module 
Control interface 
Input module Output module 
Output module Input module 
Fig. 4. Sample log management system (from 
[9]). 
Alert system 
Fig. 5. General view of FM-based LMS infrastructure. 
Log system 
System (events) 
Response system 
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transmission). Any of these events is a change of state in an 
active system which is viewed as a flowsystem. They trigger 
creating and processing log entries. Events are actions (in 
common sense), while logs, in this case, are records of the 
actions.  
Logs, in their turn, are flowthings. Some log entries trigger 
alarms. Alarms, in its different forms, are flowthings that 
can be created, processed, received, released, and transfer. 
Alarms, also, trigger responses. Typically, a response is a 
type of an action (purposeful event), hence, it is a flowthing. 
Fig. 6 shows the possible sequence of flowthings. 
Nevertheless, in the context of security-related events, 
system‘s events can be viewed as an outside action (e.g., 
attack) and system‘s reaction as shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows a detailed representation of these 
flowsystems. Notice that the log system keeps recording all 
activities including alarms and responses (circles 1 and 2). 
In the figure, instead of drawing too many dotted arrows, 
triggering mechanisms are drawn starting from the edge of 
the flowsystem box to denote that origins of activities can be 
in any point in the flowsystem.  
These figures provide a theoretical framework for LMS in 
terms of a flow-based conceptual model. We assume that the 
log system includes all typical functions such as analysis, 
archiving, and reporting. Thus, the log system by itself is a 
complex of flowsystems of flowthings that are related to 
logging. The same flow-based methodology can be utilised 
as different levels of descriptions. In the next section we 
concentrate on the classification of events as part of the log 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
Log 
Alarm 
Response 
Fig. 6. General sequences of flowthings. 
Reaction 
Log 
Alarm 
Response 
Fig. 7. General sequences of flowthings in the context 
of security-related events. 
Action 
Outside action 
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Receive 
Release Process 
Create 
Transfer 
Log System 
Log 
analysis 
Log 
storage 
 
Receive 
Release Process 
Create System 
(reaction) 
 Receive 
Release Process 
Create 
Transfer 
Response 
System 
 
Receive 
Release Process 
Create 
Transfer 
Alert 
System 
Transfer 
 Fig. 8. Conceptualisation of log system and related systems. 
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V. FLOW-BASED LOGGING MODEL 
FM provides a conceptual foundation for the classification 
of security-related events as received, processed, created, 
released, or transferred information events. Classification 
here is based on information flow in different stages of the 
(active) flowsystems. In addition, the flow model allows 
establishing rules for such issues as classifying the 
severity/sensitivity of processed events. In privacy 
enhancing systems, creation of personal information is 
generally a more sensitive event than processing it. In 
addition, releasing such information to outsiders is a more 
privacy-significant event than receiving it. In such cases it is 
possible to configure a type of filtering mechanism that 
would apply to these types of events; e.g., the rule: the event 
of releasing personal identifiable information to an outsider 
triggers sending an e-mail to alert the proprietor of that 
personal identifiable information, as required by some 
privacy regulations.  
Separate protection mechanisms can be used for each class 
of log information. ―The use of different mechanisms for 
different classification gives the opportunity to use 
mechanisms that give more usability for information that 
doesn‘t need that strong mechanism. This allows the 
possibilities of using the same mechanism with lower 
assurance or strength‖ [17]. 
There are many security-oriented event classifications. We 
review a few methods as examples [4].  
AIX [5] uses the following classifications (some 
subcategories are deleted for the sake of brevity): 
A.   Security Policy Events 
-Subject Events: process creation, process deletion, setting 
subject security attributes 
-Object Events: object creation, object deletion, object open, 
object close  
- Import/Export Events: importing or exporting an object 
-Accountability Events: adding a user, changing user 
attributes in the password database, user login, and user 
logoff 
-General System Administration Events: use of privilege, 
file system configuration, device definition and 
configuration, normal system shutdown 
-Security Violations (potential): access permission refusals, 
privilege failures, diagnostically detected faults and system 
errors. 
In such a long list of events, grouping is performed 
according to subject/object, then import/export, then 
violations. In this case, a list seems to be built from 
examining different rules (subject/object), functions (e.g., 
accountability), organisational units (system administration), 
and status (violations). 
In the area of network intrusion events, Kazienko and 
Dorosz [11] list monitoring of the following events groups: 
- Network traffic (packets) attempting to access the host  
- Login activity on the networking layer  
- Actions of a super-user (root)  
- File system integrity, e.g., any changes to the files  
- System registers state  
- The state of key operating system files and streams 
We can observe no systemised grouping of event types: 
activities, actions, or changes to files, states, and streams, 
extracted from the network operating environment. 
Windows event logs contain the following types of events 
[12]: error event, warning event, information event 
(successful operation of an application, driver, or service), 
success audit event, failure audit event. Again, these classes 
of events seem to lack systemisation and are specified 
according to the hosting system. 
HP recommends basic monitored events: admin event, login 
event, moddac self-auditing event, execv, execve, and pset 
event [12]. ―Admin‖, ―login‖, ―exec‖… seem to be targeted 
events according to the specifics of the system. 
Web Services Architecture [15] contains an ―audit guard‖ 
that monitors agents, resources, and services, and actions 
relative to one or more services. We again note the 
heterogeneous categorisation of monitoring types. 
It can be concluded that a general theory for event 
classification for monitoring purposes is lacking. The 
required classification must be generic in the sense that it is 
not tied to any specific system activity. In the next section, 
we introduce the foundation of such an approach to event 
logging. 
From the security point of view, monitoring for security 
breaches can be accomplished by way of network level 
TCP/IP, server, and application, and through process-
specific monitoring [7]. A record of monitoring typically 
shows the identity of any entity that has accessed a system 
and types of operations executed. It may include attempted 
accesses and services, a sequence of events that have 
resulted in modifying data. The purpose is mostly to provide 
evidence for reconstruction of the sequence of events that 
led to a certain effect or change. 
To accomplish its function, a log system runs in a privileged 
mode to oversee and monitor all operations. Key 
information in such a system includes information format, 
type of activity, identity, storage, location, time, cause, tools 
and mechanisms used, and so forth [13]. 
VI. EXPERIMENTATION: SECURITY-RELATED LOGS 
There is no system that uses the proposed FM-based 
classification of security-related events. Consequently, we 
have opted to inspect one current log of events to identify 
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entries that can be classified accordingly.  We select a sample log file extracted from Cisco PIX (Private Internet 
eXchange) firewall logging monitor tool [16]. PIX is a 
popular IP firewall and network address translation (NAT) 
appliance that runs a custom-written proprietary operating 
system originally called Finesse (Fast Internet Server 
Executive), now known simply as PIX OS. It is classified as 
a network layer firewall with stateful inspection, which 
means it keeps track of the state of network connections 
(such as TCP streams, UDP communication) travelling 
across it. Technically the PIX would more precisely be 
called a Layer 4—Transport Layer—Firewall, although its 
access is not restricted to Network Layer routing, but to 
socket-based connections. By default it allows outbound 
traffic , which is the traffic generated from the inside host to 
the outside one, and it allows only inbound traffic generated 
in response to a valid request from an insider or allowed by 
a predefined access control list (ACL) or conduit. The PIX 
can be configured to perform many functions, including 
network address translation (NAT) and port address 
translation (PAT), as well as being a virtual private network 
(VPN) endpoint appliance. [16] 
The PIX, like many other security devices, has a logging 
tool. This tool helps security engineers and network 
administrators to track, debug, and monitor any normal or 
abnormal security events.  
The log classifies events according to their predefined 
severity: Emergencies, Alerts, Critical, Errors, Warnings, 
Notifications, Informational, and Debugging. 
Table 1 shows a view of the output screen, including tracked 
events in the PIX firewall. It shows some error logs, for 
example, one stating no translation found for a specific IP 
address, and other informational logs of building and 
denying TCP connections according to the rules of allowing 
and denying traffic of the PIX firewall, and higher severity 
logs are also shown, like termination of some TCP or UDP 
connections because of time out or for other reasons. 
Different event meanings are shown in Table 2. 
The entire sample log file is examined for entries that can be 
classified according to the five stages of FM. We can 
classify each row in the event log by matching the actual 
meaning of the log with the theoretical concept of the FM 
classification model (created, processed, received, disclosed, 
communicated), as shown in Table 3. The table contains 
only selected rows from Table 2. 
The first row in Table 3: 
Login permitted from 53.215.253.172/49810 to 
Inside:53.215.253.254/https for user **** 
is a request to access, and the request is accepted according 
to authentication. It is received event. Note that the 
receiving component in the system has its own processing 
aspect. Received means that the original imported data has 
been kept in its original form. It could be compared with 
(operated on), as in this case, a stored file in the receiving 
state, but the data itself has not been changed in form. 
 
Table 1. Sample logged entries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Different event meanings.  
P a g e  | 80    Vol. 10 Issue 6 Ver. 1.0  July  2010 Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 
 
 
 
Seq Event Meaning 
1 
Login permitted from 53.215.253.172/49810 to 
Inside:53.215.253.254/https for user **** 
User has been logged in to the system 
2 
Deny udp src Outside:53.215.0.241/49197 dst 
Inside:53.215.253.122/2056 
System denies the "udp" connection requested from outside 
source to inside agent 
3 
Device completed SSL handshake with client 
Inside:53.215.253.172/49810 
Secure Sockets Layer used for transmitting private documents 
via the Internet 
4 
Built inbound TCP connection for 
inside2:192.168.253.129/2608 to 
Inside:53.215.253.100/110 
Connection built on user request and traffic prepared to be sent 
to the outside 
5 
portmap translation creation failed for udp src 
inside2:192.168.253.180/1025 dst Inside 
Connection cannot be created between the client and the 
WWW server 
6 53.215.253.179 Accessed URL 213.199.141.140 The user accessed a URL 
7 
Deny TCP (no connection) from 207.46.148.33/80 to 
53.215.253.62/58806 flags SYN ACK 
The connection closed (Terminated) 
8 
Permit TCP connection from 207.46.148.33/80 to 
53.215.253.62/58806 flags Backup 
The connection has been created 
9 
SSL client Inside:53.215.253.172/52321 request to 
resume previous session. 
Request from user to restore the session 
10 
Built outbound TCP connection for 
Outside:213.199.141.140/80 to 
Inside:53.215.253.179/1417 
Connection built on user request and traffic sent to the inside 
11 
Deny TCP (no connection) from 65.55.15.123/80 to 
53.215.253.62/43197 flags SYN ACK 
The connection closed (Terminated) 
12 
portmap translation created for udp src 
inside2:192.168.253.180/1025 dst 
Inside:192.168.93.3/161 
Connection created between the client and the WWW server 
13 
Teardown ICMP connection for faddr 
196.221.174.51/0 laddr 192.168.253.115 
Connection closed because of SYN timeout 
14 
Permit outbound UDP connection for 
Outside:77.28.78.85/10780 to inside2 
Connection built on user request and traffic sent to the inside 
15 
Built inbound ICMP connection for faddr 
196.221.174.51/0  laddr 192.168.253.115 
Connection built on user request and traffic sent to the outside 
16 
Teardown dynamic TCP translation from 
inside2:192.168.253.109/1352 to Outside 
Connection closed because of SYN timeout 
Table 3. Event classifications according to FM model 
 
Event Create Process Receive Release Transfer 
1 Login permitted from 53.215.253.172/49810 to 
Inside:53.215.253.254/https for user **** 
  *   
2 Deny udp src Outside:53.215.0.241/49197 dst 
Inside:53.215.253.122/2056 
 * *   
3 Device completed SSL handshake with client 
Inside:53.215.253.172/49810 
 *  *  
5 portmap translation creation failed for udp src 
inside2:192.168.253.180/1025 dst Inside 
 * * * * 
6 53.215.253.179 Accessed URL 213.199.141.140 * * *   
8 Permit TCP connection from 207.46.148.33/80 to 53.215.253.62/58806 
flags Backup 
* *  * * 
16 Teardown dynamic TCP translation from inside2:192.168.253.109/1352 
to Outside 
   * * 
 
The second row in Table 3 shows a deny action taken by the 
security device, where the request was received and 
processed.  
System deny the "udp" connection requested from outside 
source to inside agent 
 
 
 
The request was processed because it involved inside agent. 
This implies that the original request was analysed to break 
it down into components.  
Note that in such a system, alert is not incorporated as an 
independent notion into the system. In our methodology, the 
process may be visualised as follows: 
1. Receiving stage: Request Q has been received by user A. 
(Apparently, user A is a legitimate user, otherwise, it would 
be denied access, as in the previous case) 
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2. Processing stage: request has been processed as  
"udp" connection requested from outside source to inside 
agent 
The processing module denied permission. 
3. Log system: Creating registries of these events in the log 
system. If (this event has been designated as alarm), then 
trigger alarm system. 
4. Alarm system: Create alarm description, and then trigger 
response system.  
Response system: Instruction to the receiving module to 
watch out for this user. 
Row 3: 
Device completed SSL handshake with client 
Inside:53.215.253.172/49810 
shows a different classification event: 
Process: The device did a handshake with the host to ensure 
availability. 
Release: After ensuring of host availability, traffic is 
prepared to be sent to that host. 
Row number 4 indicates: 
Built inbound TCP connection for inside2: 
192.168.253.129/2608 to Inside: 53.215.253.100/110 
The entry means four different actions:  
1- Received: authenticated user. 
2- Processed: authorised operation. 
3- Created: built inbound TCP connection. 
4- Released: traffic was prepared to be sent ―disclosed‖ to 
the outside. 
Note how the sequence of events was registered by these 
FM log entries, as shown in Fig. 8. If there is an alert, it 
involves the entire sequence of events, not only the last one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Row 5 states: 
portmap translation creation failed for udp src 
inside2:192.168.253.180/1025 dst Inside 
 
This means the connection cannot be created between the 
client and the WWW server. In terms of the FM model, the 
sequence of events is:  
1- Receiving: request from the host. 
2- Processing: to check for permission  
3- Releasing: buffering the data to be sent 
4- Transferring: denying the connection requested. 
Here the desired connection is not clear. Failure to establish 
connection may indicate decisions made at several stages. 
Figure 9 shows the stream of flow of possible 
communication between source and destination, where the 
system acts as mediator. The crossed circles denote 
positions where a decision is made to abort the connection. 
For example, it is possible that the distinction is a 
blacklisted site; thus, any request to connect to that site is 
rejected at the transfer or receive stages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is contrast to line 6, which states: 
53.215.253.179 Accessed URL 213.199.141.140 
Here the user requests access to a certain WWW server; 
after processing, the connection is created. 
In row number 8: 
Permit TCP connection from 207.46.148.33/80 to 
53.215.253.62/58806 flags Backup 
―Backup‖ results from transferring files from their original 
location to another location like media storage. This would 
establish a communication channel between source and 
destination to release and transfer the backup information. 
Notice that storage in FM is divided logically into five 
stages. Suppose that the transferred files are log system files. 
These are created information and should be stored in the 
new location as such.  
Line 16:  
Teardown dynamic TCP translation from 
inside2:192.168.253.109/1352 to Outside 
This is an example of an event without receiving that does 
not involve the receiving stage. It could be because of the 
connection timeout; hence the system closes the session. 
Other events can be classified in the same way. The key 
issue is knowing the actual meaning of each event in the log 
so it can be easily classified by mapping it to the theoretical 
concept of the FM classification model. 
For security-related events the FM approach provides a 
logical map for clear description of the sequence of events 
that cause a security-related awareness. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a theoretical framework for LMS in 
terms of a flow-based conceptual model with emphasis on 
security-related events. The framework includes four 
separate flow systems: active system, log system, alarm 
system, and response system. All systems are composed in 
terms of flow systems. The experimental part of the paper 
concentrates on log analysis in the log system. 
The high level modelling methodology provides a promising 
approach for LMS design. Further research aims at 
constructing a centralised LMS for simple hardware/ 
software system where the flowsystem and its classification 
are applied right from the beginning. 
VIII.  REFERENCES 
1) Al-Fedaghi, S. (2010). Threat risk modeling. 2010 
International Conference on Communication 
Receive Processed 
Created Released 
Transferred 
Fig. 8. Map of compound events involved in 
row 4 of Table 3. 
Log Log Log 
Log 
Log 
Receive Release 
Process 
 
                          Transfer 
Destination Source 
Fig. 9. Streams of flow in line 5, Table 3. 
P a g e  | 82    Vol. 10 Issue 6 Ver. 1.0  July  2010 Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 
 
 
 
Software and Networks (ICCSN 2010), Singapore, 
26-28 February. 
2) Al-Fedaghi, S. (2009). On developing service-
oriented Web applications. The 2009 AAAI 
(Advancement of Artificial Intelligence)/IJCAI 
(International Joint Conferences on Artificial 
Intelligence) Workshop on  Information Integration 
on the Web (IIWeb:09), July 11, Pasadena, CA, 
USA. Paper: 
http://research.ihost.com/iiweb09/notes/9-P4-
ALFEDAGHI.pdf 
3) Al-Fedaghi, S. (2009). Flow-based description of 
conceptual and design levels. IEEE International 
Conference on Computer Engineering and 
Technology 2009, January 22-24. Singapore. 
4) Al-Fedaghi, S., & Mahdi, F. (2010). Events 
classification in log audit. International Journal of 
Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), 
2(2). http://airccse.org/journal/nsa/0410ijnsa5.pdf  
5) AIX, System management concepts: Operating 
system and devices (1st ed.) Chapter 3, Auditing 
overview.  (September 1999). http://www.chm.tu-
dresden.de/edv/manuals/aix/aixbman/admnconc/au
dit.htm 
6) Dijkstra, E. W. (2003). On the role of scientific 
thought. 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions
/EWD04xx/EWD447.html  
7) Becta. (2009). Good practice in information 
handling: Audit logging and incident handling. 
Becta, V2, March 2009 
http://schools.becta.org.uk/upload-
dir/downloads/audit_logging.doc 
8) GFI. (2008). Auditing events. 
http://docstore.mik.ua/manuals/hp-ux/en/5992-
3387/ch10s04.html  
9) Fischer, R. (2007, April). Motivations and 
challenges in designing a distributed log 
management framework. Diploma Thesis, Institut 
f¨ur Softwaretechnik und interaktive Systeme. 
http://cocoon.ifs.tuwien.ac.at/lehre/diplomarbeiten/
2007_Fischer.pdf  
10) Gerhards, R. (2005, Oct.). The syslog protocol. 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-syslog-protocol  
11) Kazienko, P., & Dorosz, P. (2004). Intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) Part 2 - Classification; 
methods; techniques. WindowsSecurity.com.  
12) http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/IDS-
Part2-Classification-methods-techniques.html 
13) GFI EventsManager. (2009, October). GFI 
Software Ltd. Manual. 
http://www.gfi.com/esm/esm8manual.pdf 
14) SANS Consensus Project. (2007). Information 
system audit logging requirements. SANS Institute. 
http://www.sans.org/resources/policies/info_sys_au
dit.pdf 
15) The Apache Software Foundation. (2006). 
Common log format. 
.http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/logs.html#accessl
og  
16) W3C Working Draft 8, Web Services Architecture, 
August 2003. 
17) Cisco PIX, Dec 2009. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cisco_PIX 
18) Försvarets Materielverk, FMV (Swedish Defence 
Material Administration), Design Rule: Security 
aspects of information, 2008-04-30. 
https://www.fmv.se/upload/Bilder%20och%20dok
ument/Vad%20gor%20FMV/Uppdrag/LedsystT/F
MLS%202010/FMLS%20Design%20Rules/LT1O
%20P06-
0108%20DR%20Security%20aspects%20of%20inf
ormation%203.0.pdf  
19) Kent, K., & Souppaya, M. (2006, Sept.) Guide to 
computer security log management. 
Recommendations of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, NIST Special 
Publication 800-92. 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
92/SP800-92.pdf  
20) Shenk, J. (2008, Oct.). Log management in the 
cloud: A comparison of in-house versus cloud-
based management of log data. SANS Whitepaper. 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_progra
m/LogMgmtCloud_Oct08.pdf  
21) Shenk, J. (2010, Apr.). SANS sixth annual log 
management survey report. SANS Whitepaper. 
https://www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_progr
am/logmgtsurvey-2010.pdf  
22) Mueller, P. (2008, May 31). Facing the monster: 
The labors of log management. InformationWeek. 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/global-
cio/compliance/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=20840
0730  
23) Olzak, T. (2010, Apr. 24). Five common gaps in 
logical network security. Bright Hub, Edited & 
published by Michele McDonough. 
http://www.brighthub.com/computing/enterprise-
security/articles/66298.aspx?p=2 
24) Adam, S. (2002). A new architecture for managing 
enterprise log data. In: Proceedings of the 16th 
Systems Administration Conference (LISA-02). 
Philadelphia, PA: USENIX Association, 121–132. 
 
 
 
 
